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NoTEs
amounts of money spent thereon. Thus, the exclusive right to explore is
recognized as a valuable right, and one to be bargained for, bought and
sold as any tangible.
It would seem harsh to say that in Wyoming only nominal damages
can be recovered today for a trespass, as in the Martel case, regardless of
the proof of damages. It is submitted that it is merely a matter of degree
in evidence as to whether damages are too speculative to allow recovery,
and that the Martel case, in recognizing the invasion of a right, would
allow damages upon sufficient proof. Thus, where it can be shown that
the mineral owner had a valid offer that was withdrawn because of the
trespasser's acts, the damages are not speculative. Present practices should
also cause recognition of established market values where leases are being
bought and sold in the area, and it appears reasonable that the lease could
have been sold for a certain amount, so that value is definite enough to
take the damages out of the speculative category. Where the holder of the
mineral title cannot show that he had an offer or even that it might reasonably be concluded that he could have leased for a determined amount, his
damages are speculative and recovery will be denied.
LEONARD McEWAN

VALUATION OF A WIDOW'S LIFE ESTATE
FOR ELECTION PURPOSES
It frequently happens that it is necessary to calculate the value of
a life estate. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make an exact calculation,
thus parties seeking such a determination must be satisfied with a just or
equitable result. The problem arises in such situations as the partition of
2
property' and the determination of value for inheritance tax purposes.
However, the present concern is with the method of determining the
value of a widow's life estate, for purposes of determining whether the
widow may elect to take her statutory share against the husband's will
3
under Wyoming's forced heir statute.
In past history, various methods for determining the value of life
estates have been relied upon. Possibly, the most simple is the agreement
of the parties in interest,4 such as the life tenant and the remainderman.
This would be an acceptable solution at the present time, but it is seldom
that the parties are so agreeable. In England, a rule was established that
5
the value of a life estate should be a one-third share of the net estate.
This was known as the Equitable or the Common-law rule. This rule has
1.
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South Carolina Savings Bank v. Stansell, 160 S.C. 81, 158 S.E. 131 (1931).
In re Leonard's Estate, 199 Misc. 138, 100 NY. Supp.2d 105 (1950).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-301 (1945).
United States v. 15,883.55 Acres of Land in Spartanburg County, South Carolina,
45 F. Supp. 783 (1942).
Keniston v. Gorrell, 74 N.H. 53, 64 At. 1101 (1906).
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been abolished, as being unreasonable and giving absurd results. It has
been pointed out that a person at the age of eighty, with perhaps one year
to live, should not have the same interest in a life estate, as a person at the
age of twenty. 6
At the present time, an absolute majority of the courts seek help from
mortality tables to determine the present value of a life estate. In the
past, various mortality tables have been compiled and for various reasons
have proved to be faulty. 7 The two main mortality tables, recognized by the
courts today, are the Carlisle tables and the American Experience tables. 8
The Carlisle tables were compiled by Joshua Milne in about the year
1787, from the facts of life and death, according to the population of the
community of Carlisle, England. For the most part, these tables are good,
but it has been stated that they are faulty and give anomalous results in
the death rate at certain ages. However, they were used as a basis for the
compiling of the American Experience tables. The Carlisle tables have
been further criticized for the fact that they are concentrated on one community and may give unfavorable results in communities in which the
climate and living habits are different than those found in Carlisle, England. 9 As one court pointed out, this table was compiled from conditions
different from the living conditions found in this country, especially in
our large cities. 10
The American Experience table was originally compiled by Sheppard
Homans, based upon fifteen years of experience of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York."
The general rule is that the proper method for calculating the present
value of the life estate, is to determine the probable duration of life of
the life tenant, based upon the tables of life expectancy and considering
the habits, state of health of the life tenant, and other circumstances of
the particular case.' 2 Today, courts are agreed that mortality tables are
admissible in evidence to determine the value of a life estate. However,
the mortality tables are not conclusive, and the facts of habits, physical
appearance, constitution and state of health of the life tenant must be
considered.' 3 A jury must be instructed that mortality tables are not an
4
exclusive guide and failure to so instruct is considered reversible error.'
Present value of the right of dower has been subject to a large amount
of litigation. A dower interest is considered as a life estate of the widow
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Williams' Case, 3 Bland. 200 (1831); see also, Dowell v. Dowell, 209 Ark. 175, 189
S.W. 797 (1945); White v. White, 4 Ves. 24 (1798).
Williams' Case, 3 Bland. 200, 247 (1831).
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Houchins, 121 Ky. 526, 89 S.W. 530 (1905).
Steinbrunner v. Pittsburg & W.R. Co., 146 Pa. 504, 23 Atl. 239 (1892).
McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 Atl. 810 (1926).
Williams' Case, 3 Bland. 200 (1831).
McCommon v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 581, 187 At. 445 (1936).
Ibid.
Alabama Mineral R. Co. v. Jones, 114 Ala. 519, 62 Am.St.Rep. 121, 87 A.L.R. 929
(1896) ; see also Steiner v. Berney, 130 Ala. 289, 30 So. 570 (1901).

NOTEs
in one-third of the property of her husband.' 5 Thus, the same method
can be used in determining the present value of a life estate, left to a
surviving spouse, as is used in determining dower consumate. The tables
have also been used by a South Carolina court,1 6 to determine the value of
inchoate dower. The court pointed out that such a determination involved
an ascertainment of the present value of an annuity for her life, equal to
the one-third interest in the proceeds of the estate, and then deduct therefrom the value of a similar annuity based upon the expectant joint livelihood of the husband and wife. In the same case, as a matter of dictum, the
court related that the value of the dower consummated depended upon
the value of the property, the age, life expectancy, habits, constitution and
health of the widow.
In the case of In re Ferrara'sEstate, 7 the widower was given a life
estate by the will. The estate was determinable by remarriage of the
life tenant. The widower elected to take against the will. The court
followed a prior decision' 8 and held that upon such an election the value
of the several gifts must be ascertained. The widower's share must then
be calculated on the probable duration of his life, according to mortality
tables. The situation was somewhat complicated by the fact that the life
estate was to be terminated by his possible remarriage. The court resolved
the effect of remarriage by assuming that the unmarried or widower status
would continue until the eventuality of his death.
In Wyoming, if a testator bequeathed to his wife a life estate with
remainder over, the possibility of election against the will would necessitate
a determination of the value of the life estate to ascertain if the widow
had been given less than her statutory share.' 9 Just what procedure
would be followed in Wyoming is somewhat open to conjecture. The
matter of the present valuation of a life estate has never, as yet, been
decided by the Supreme Court of Wyoming.
We have been given a guide by statute, as to the determination of the
value of a life estate for inheritance tax purposes, which directs the use of
mortality tables. 20 Thus, a formula for computing the present value of
a life estate in Wyoming would be to figure an annunity on the net estate,
ascertaining the life expectancy according to a mortality table, possibly
the American Experience Table of Mortality, taking into consideration
15.

Classen v. Heath, 389 Ill. 183, 58 N.E.2d 889 (1945); see also Strayer v. Long, 86
Va. 557, 10 S.E. 574 (1890); Holt v. Hamlin, 120 Tenn. 496, 111 S.W. 241 (1908).
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Landshaw v. Drake, 183 S.C. 536, 191 SE713 (1937); see also American Blower Co.
v. MacKenzie, 197 N.C. 152, 147 S.E. 829, 64 A.L.R. 1047 (1929); Share v Trickle,
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183 Wis. 1, 197 N.W. 329 (1924).
In re Ferrara's Estate, 165 Misc. 900, 1 N.Y Supp.2d 900 (1938).
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In re Curley's Estate, 160 Misc. 844, 290 N.Y. Supp. 822 (1936).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-301 (1945).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-2121 (1945). . . . The value of every future or contingent
or limited
estate, income, interest, or annuity
dependent
upon
any
life or lives in being shall be determined by the rules and standard tables of
mortality, in use by the insurance commissioner of this state, and the rate of
interest for computing the present value of all future and contingent interests or

estates shall be five (5) per cent per annum."
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the habits, living conditions and state of health of the life tenant.
So long as the husband's life expectancy is a factor in computing the
value of the life estate, it is extremely difficult, as well as hazardous, to
advise a testator regarding provisions for a life estate for his spouse with
any certainty as to whether his testamentary plan would be accomplished.
Since it would depend upon the age of the surviving spouse at the death
of the testator, such prediction is beyond the scope of certainty. The
shorter the life expectancy of the widow at the death of the hubsand, the
greater the chance of taking against the will when given a life estate.
In contrast to the foreging situation is the detailed legislation of New
York State, under which a provision in the will for a trust fund or life
estate can only be partially defeated. The statute sets a ceiling amount that
can be withdrawn from the life interest, and further provides that the
value of the principal is to be used in determining election rights. Thus
it is unnecessary to determine the value of a life estate under the New
21
York statute.
Insofar as legislation such as New York's provides a firm value for
the widow's life interest, the task of planning distribution is eased.
EARL L. WILLIAMS, JR.

SURFACE DAMAGE UNDER A FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASE
The western stockraisers are owners of vast acreages of land valuable
for oil and gas production, of which they own only the surface estate, with
the United States having reserved the rights to the minerals, and oil and
gas in the original patent. Where such minerals have been reserved, the
mineral estate, including the underlying oil and gas deposits, is the
dominant estate, with the surface being, the servient estate. In order to
fully develop the underlying minerals it is necessary to use part of the
servient or surface estate, resulting in a loss of the use of the surface estate
including a loss of the grass necessary for raising stock. The extent to
which the surface owner may be entitled to compensation for such loss
comprises the basis for the ensuing analysis.
Under the Picket Act of 19101 the Federal Government authorized the
President to withdraw public lands from entry which were potentially
valuable for minerals. Within the next decade there followed legislative
21.
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New York § 18(g) Decedent Estate Law. The provisions of this section with
regard to the creation of a trust, with income payable for life to the surviving
spouse, shall likewise apply to a legal life estate or an an annuity for life or any
other form of income for life created by the will for the benefit of the surviving
spouse. In the computation of the value of the provisions under the will the
capital value of the fund or other property producing the income shall be taken
and not the value of the life estate.
36 Stat. 847 (1910),

43 U.S.C. j 141 (1952 ed.).

